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THE CLOSE CORPORATION UNDER THE NEW SOUTH
CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW*
WFsM n MYERs, JR.**
PART I
In recent years the close corporation has become the prevalent
business form in America. As a result of its popularity most
general practitioners have come into contact with it, and, indeed,
most lawyers are seldom concerned with the public corporation
except in relation to tort litigation. The significance of the close
corporation to American business life is further evidenced by
a growing body of literature.'
One writer suggests that the close corporation defies defini-
tion.2 It is characterized by restricted and limited ownership,
identity of management and ownership, and a tendency of the
participants to consider themselves partners inter sese. The South
Carolina Code (hereafter referred to as Code) defines the close
corporation as a corporation the shares of which "are not traded
on any national securities exchange or regularly traded in any
over-the-counter market maintained by one or more brokers or
dealers in securities."3
The choice of the corporate form of business organization
may be desirable for a number of reasons. For example, the busi-
ness may involve serious risks which would be mitigated by
corporate limited liability; expansion and financing are usually
more readily achieved through the corporate form ;4 tax advan-
tages and control can often be achieved.5 However, in a small
enterprise each participant desires some voice and perhaps a
*This Article is in two parts. Part two Will appear in a subsequent issue.
**Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. See, e.g., O'NEAL., CLOSE CORORATOIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2 VOLS.
1958); Symposium-The Close Corporation, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1
(1959) ; Scott, Close Corporation in Contemporary Business, 13 Bus. LAW.
741 (1958) ; Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership; 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 435 (1953); Close Corporations: A Symposium, 52
Nw.U.L.REv. 345 (1951); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation:
Norms Versus Needs, 11 U.FLA.L.REv. 433 (1958).
2. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L. Q. 488, 491
(1948).
3. S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.22(c) ; 12-22.14(b) (1962). This definition ac-
cords with Professor O'Neal's view. See 1 O'NEA., op. cit. supra note 1, at
2-5, 13-16.
4. For an excellent discussion of factors to be considered in the choice of
business form see DuxE UNIV., CHO SING A FORM OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
(1963).
5. For discussions of the tax considerations involved in the close corporation
see Tax Problems of Close Corporations-A Survey, 10 W. REs. L. REv.
9 (1959) ; Lowndes, Taxing the Income of the Close Corporation, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 558 (1953).
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veto in management decisions. He wants protection for his posi-
tion. The partnership form affords a maximum of protection
while the corporation places greater importance on adaptability
and majority rule. This can lead to unfortunate awakenings in a
close corporation since the participants often believe that spe-
cial fiduciary relationships exist.
One of the recurring themes throughout this article is the ex-
tent to which the new Code provides a better balance between
protection and adaptability. Certainly flexibility in corporate
drafting was a major goal of the Code. The Reporter, Professor
Folk, stated that one of the principal guidelines was the desire
to permit the shareholders in a close corporation to act almost
as freely as if they were in partnership with respect to the in-
ternal affairs of the corporation.6 Accordingly, the Code ex-
plicitly recognizes that many small corporations are no more
than incorporated partnerships.
7
A cursory examination of the articles of incorporation filed
since the new Code went into effect reveals that the new cor-
porate planning techniques have not been utilized. The lawyer
must accept a role with regard to the form of business organiza-
tion that is far more complex than the mere drafting of instru-
ments. As in estate planning, it is a role for which the lawyer
is specially suited. His ability to determine the important issues
in the various fields of law, such as property, corporations and
taxation, will play an important part in the overall planning.
The lawyer must seek out the facts and raise the problems with
his client to be certain they receive the proper understanding and
consideration. This, then, is the obligation, even where the client
insists that he needs no help other than the attorney's signature
on the form.
Some lawyers fear that the client is unwilling to pay for the
"full treatment." Most clients are initially unaware of the prob-
lems that might be solved or avoided by careful planning. If the
lawyer is able to make known to the client the complexities of
the situation and their importance, fee difficulties should be
resolved.
This article is intended to be in the nature of a survey of some
of the important changes in small corporations planning wrought
by the new Code. Certain features which have been discussed
6. Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15
S.C.L.REv. 275, 281 (1963).
7. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.22 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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previously7a in relation to general corporation law are recon-
sidered in the perspective of their effect upon the close cor-
poration.
The One-Man Corporation
The attitudes underlying the new Code are clearly reflected
in the treatment of the one-man corporation. The ownership of
all of the shares of a corporation by a single person has received
general judicial approval." Yet more than one incorporator is
still required in approximately forty states.9 The common method
of avoiding this requirement is using dummy incorporators to
perfect incorporation and then turning the business over to the
real parties in interest.10 The requirement serves no useful pur-
pose and survives as "a relic from the concept that a corporation
is the product of a number of persons associating for some com-
mon object.""
The new Code clearly recognizes the legal validity of the one-
man corporation. Section 12-14.212 permits "one or more persons"
to organize a corporation. Section 12-18.3(a)13 requires three
directors "except that if all shares of a corporation are owned
beneficially and of record by fewer than three shareholders, the
number of directors may be less than three but not less than the
number of shareholders." Thus, the new Code establishes a pol-
icy of modern simplicity in regard to the one-man corporation,
by providing that the single individual can incorporate and
directly control the incorporated enterprise.
7a. See Symposium, on the South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L.R.
275 (1963).
8. See Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Com-
pany, 51 HAnv. L. REv. 1373, 1378 (1938). This view had been accepted in South
Carolina. See Gordon v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.C. 438,
49 S.E.2d 718 (1948). The danger of lack of clarity is evidenced by a North Caro-
lina case which intimated that sole ownership destroyed the corporate entity.
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473, 85 S.E.2d 677 (1955),
af!'d on rehearing, 243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956), overruled by N. C.
GEN. STAT. §55-31 (1960).
9. See 1 HORNSTEIN, CoxwRo0 ox LAW AND PRAc-icE § 135 (Supp. 1964).
10. See 1 'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 7.
11. HORNSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 163.
12. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.2 (1962).
13. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.3(9) (1962). Note that several attempts to vali-
date a single incorporator has suffered due to a lack of consistency in other sec-
tions of the Corporation code. See Ham, Close Corporations under Kentucky
Law, 50 Ky. L. J. 125, 127-34 (1961). The new South Carolina Code eliminates
such ambiguities. For example, Section 12-11.4(b) (1) requires execution of the
articles of incorporation "by the incorporator or incorporators!' S. C. CODE
ANN. § 12-11.4(b) (1) (1962).
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Slhareholders' Voting Agreements
A common arrangement among participants in a close corpora-
tion is to agree in advance to vote their stock a certain way. For
example, such an agreement could be entered into by a group of
minority shareholders in order to secure representation on the
board of directors or to assure control of the board. The agree-
ment could provide that the shareholders would vote as a unit
in accordance with decisions of the majority, or to vote for des-
ignated persons who may be parties to the agreement. In other
words, the membership of the board of directors could be frozen
for the life of the agreement. This would tend to protect against
the possible squeezeout of someone who is depending on his posi-
tion in the corporation for his livelihood. Such agreements may
cover other matters subject to shareholder vote. They are an
integral part of corporate planning and usually used in conjunc-
tion with other control techniques for best results.
Many early courts invalidated such agreements, but the mod-
ern tendency is to approve them provided a proper purpose can
be established. 14 The principal objection was the contemplated
separation of voting power from the ownership of stock.15 In
South Carolina, prior to the new Code, the legality of voting
agreements was explored in Johnson v. Spartanburg County
Fair Ass'n.'6 It was contended that purported irrevocable proxies
given by several shareholders could not be revoked because this
constituted an implied shareholder contract. The only supportive
evidence of a contract was a statement in the proxy form that
because other shareholders were signing a like proxy the proxy
was irrevocable. The court correctly held no agreement existed
and the proxy revocable. Then the court stated:
If we assume that these proxies constituted an agreement
between such stockholders to vote their stock in a specified
manner or for a specified purpose, the proxies would be
revocable as the agreement would not be supported by any
other consideration other than the mutual agreements of
the stockholders to vote as stated in the proxies.
7
It was recognized that mutual promises are sufficient consid-
eration for each other, but ". . . such a consideration alone has
14. 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. stupra note 1, at 226-31.
15. Ibid.
16. 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947).
17. Id. at 72, 41 S.E.2d at 606.
4
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never been deemed sufficient to make binding an agreement be-
tween stockholders to vote in a specified manner . *... ,.s No
reason is given for this exception to the general principles of
contract law other than public policy. "Probably this idea
evolved from an erroneous extension of the rule that a proxy
to vote shares (being merely an agency) is revocable (though
designated as irrevocable by the creator of the agency) unless
coupled with an interest in the agent or supported by some con-
sideration running from the agent to the creator of the agency
other than the agent's undertaking to perform the agency." 19
In any event, the court's view has enjoyed only limited accept-
ance20 and has been repudiated by the new Code.21
The purposes or effects of the agreement play an important
role in determining its validity. This issue is particularly acute
where the agreement is among less than all the shareholders. An
agreement to combine in order to oppress minority shareholders
is obviously illegal.22 Yet analysis of what constitutes oppression
has been undergoing a metamorphosis. "The trend of the law
seems clearly to be toward more rigidity (and clarity) in the
requirements as to form and at the same time toward more flex-
ibility (and practicability) in regard to permissible purposes." 28
One writer helpfully suggests that any arrangement between
shareholders should include a specific and detailed statement of
its purposes and a full explanation of the business situation
which gave rise to it.24
Section 12-16.1525 validates shareholder pooling agreements
that meet certain requirements. Primarily the agreement must
18. Id. at 73, 41 S.E2d at 606.
19. 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 247-48.
20. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 799 (1956).
21. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.15 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Scripps v. Sweeney, 160 Mich. 148, 125 N.W. 72 (1910); Morel
v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625, 61 S.E. 487 (1908) ; Gage v. Fisher, 5 N.D. 297, 65 N.W.
809 (1895).
23. Sturdy, The Significance of "Form" and "Purpose" in Determining the
Effectiveness of Agreements among Shareholders to Control Corporate Man-
agement, 13 Bus. LAw. 283 (1957-58).
24. O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agreements Against Attack,
14 Bus. LAw 184, 194-95 (1958-59).
25. "Agreements by shareholders respecting voting of shares.-An agreement
between two or more shareholders, if in writing and signed by the parties there-
to, may provide that in exercising any voting rights of shares held by the
parties, including any vote with respect to directors, such shares shall be voted
as provided by the agreement, or as the parties may agree, or as determined
in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by the parties. Such agreement
shall be valid and enforceable as between the parties thereto, for a period not
to exceed ten years from the date of its execution. Such agreement may be ex-
tended or renewed in like manner as a voting trust may be extended or renewed
as provided by § 12-16.16." S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.15 (1962).
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be written and signed by the contracting parties. The contracting
parties need not include all shareholders, but an agreement of
less than all shareholders increases the possibility of its being
overturned because of improper purposes. The parties can agree
in advance on how the votes are to be cast or provide as they
direct. The decision may be by unanimous or less than unani-
mous vote. Voting decisions or shareholder deadlocks may be
relegated to a procedure agreed upon by the parties. Common
procedures include arbitration and the irrevocable proxy.
Some difficulty might arise over the duration of the agree-
ment. The length of time the contract is to remain in effect has
been considered a factor in determining validity.2 6 Section
12-16.15 fixes the duration of the agreement at a period not to
exceed ten years. The agreement may be extended for an addi-
tional period, not to exceed ten years, in the same manner as the
voting trust.27 Section 12-16.15 was ". . . intended to place the
voting trust and pooling agreement on a parity and therefore,
both are limited to a ten year period, after which both may be
renewed or extended. '28 A question may arise whether an ar-
rangement extending beyond the statutory maximum duration
is valid.20 Section 12-16.16 resolves this issue in favor of validity
in respect to voting trusts.30 Unfortunately, Section 12-16.15 is
silent. Obviously Section 12-16.16 reflects a legislative policy
that excessive duration should not affect validity, and the courts
will probably so hold. However, since the issue is not expressly
resolved, special care should be taken in drafting the duration
features of the Section 12-16.15 agreement.
The difficulties of providing for effective enforcement of
shareholder voting agreements was suggested by the famed
Ringling v. Ringling l ros.-Barnum c Bailey Combined Shows,
Ino. case.31 There, two of three shareholders agreed to act to-
gether in voting their stock, and to submit any disagreements
to an arbitrator. "The agreement (did) not describe the under-
taking of each party with respect to a decision of the arbitrator
26. 1 O'NEA., op. cit. supra note 1, at 245.
27. See S. C. CoDE ANN. § 12-16.16(e) (1962).
28. Folk, upra note 6, at 321-22.
29. See Perry v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del.Ch. 33, 191 At. 823
(1937).
30. S. C. CoDE ANN. § 12-16.16(f) (1962).
31. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29
Del.Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946), modified, 29 Del.Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
[Vol. 16
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other than to provide that it shall be binding upon the parties. 32
In a suit to enforce the agreement Chancellor Seitz was willing
to view the arbitrator as an implied agent possessing an irrevo-
cable proxy to vote the shares in the event of disagreement.83
This approach substantially amounted to specific enforcement
of the agreement. On appeal the Supreme Court of Delaware
upheld the agreement but rejected the enforcement plan of the
lower court declaring it unjustified ". . . in the absence of some
indication that the parties bargained for that means."3 4 The
court's enforcement consisted solely of refusing to count the
votes of the recalcitrant party.
The contracting parties certainly expected different treatment
in the Ringling case. The court implied a remedy when it looked
to the intention of the parties; and if an irrevocable proxy
scheme had been a part of the contract, it probably would have
been upheld. In South Carolina, after Johnson v. Spartanburg
County Fair Ass'n,3 5 there was no assurance of what means of
enforcement could be used in an otherwise valid agreement. Sec-
tion 12-16.14(f) (5)36 explicitly recognizes the legality of the
use of the irrevocable proxy to enforce a voting agreement. Like
the Section 12-16.15 agreement, an irrevocable proxy is limited
to a period not to exceed ten years, with a right of renewal.
3 7
The use of an irrevocable proxy assures that in every situation,
except in the rare instance where the proxy holder refuses to
vote as directed, the agreement is self-enforcing.,38 Specific per-
formance would achieve the same result. But, as Ringling sug-
32. Id. at 617, 53 A.2d at 445-46.
33. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29
Del.Ch. 318, 49 A.2d 603 (1946).
34. Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 29
Del.Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947). Another argument advanced for invalidity
but rejected by the court is that the parties agreed to agree in the future. The
agreement was to vote in accordance with the arbitrator's decision. However,
one writer sees difficulty with such a provision. Hoffman, New Horizons for
the Close Corporation in New York Under its New Business Corporation Law,
28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1961).
35. 210 S.C. 56, 41 S.E.2d 599 (1947).
36. "A proxy which is entitled 'irrevocable proxy' and which specifically
states that it is irrevocable, shall be irrevocable only when it is held by any of
the following .. .
(5) a person, including an arbitrator, designated by or under a stockhold-
ers' agreement as provided by § 12-16.15." S. C. CUDE ANN. § 12-16.14(f)
(5).
37. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.14(g). Again the section is silent about the
validity of irrevocable proxies which are for longer than ten years.
38. A court would undoubtedly require a reluctant proxy holder to vote as
directed.
7
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gests, whether the courts are willing to require performance is
a matter of speculation. The Section 12-16.14(f) (5) proxy is a
much more satisfactory technique to provide certain and effec-
tive enforcement.
The Delaware case of Abercrombie v. Davies89 suggested other
pitfalls for the unwary draftsman. There six shareholders trans-
ferred their shares of stock to eight "agents" who were selected
in accordance with the agreement and given the exclusive power
to vote the stock. In an action questioning the validity of the
agreement, Chancellor Seitz held that the agreement was valid
and that the agents held irrevocable proxies. 40 The Supreme
Court of Delaware reversed. It found the agreement resembled
a voting trust in the following features:
(1) that the voting rights of the pooled stock have
been divorced from the beneficial ownership, which is re-
tained by the stockholders; (2) that the voting rights have
been transferred to fiduciaries denominated Agents; (3)
that the transfer of such rights is, through the medium of
irrevocable proxies, effective for a period of ten years; (4)
that all voting rights in respect of all the stock are pooled
in the Agents as a group, through the device of proxies run-
ning to the agents jointly and severally, and no stockholder
retains the right to vote his or its shares; and (5) that on
its face, the agreement has for its principal object voting
control of American.
41
As a voting trust the agreement failed because it did not comply
with the mandatory requirements that the stock be transferred
on the books and that a copy of the agreement be filed at the
corporation's principal office.
42
39. 35 Del.Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956), reversed, 36 Del.Ch. 371, 130 A.2d
338 (1957).
40. Abercrombie v. Davis, 35 Del.Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956).
41. Abercrombie v. Davis, 36 Del.Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (1957). The court
noted that other evidence of a voting trust existed but attached special signifi-
cance to the quoted factors.
42. Ibid. The unfortunate effect of the court's decision was to permit some of
the contracting parties to disregard what had been bargained for in good faith.
The court's argument that the arrangement was a "secret" voting trust is hard-
ly persuasive where notice to third parties or others is not in issue. Compare
Kantzler v. Benzinger, 214 Ill. 598, 73 N.E. 843 (1905). ("It will be time
enough to consider the rights . . . (of outsiders) when they are before us com-
plaining."). The Abercrombie case has left the Delaware law in confusion. See
O'Neal, mipra note 24, at 192-93. A recent lower court case, again decided by
Chancellor Seitz, enforced a voting trust which expressly met the statutory
requirements for a voting trust, but the parties had not completed the mandatory
[Vol. 1L6
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The difficulties created by the Abercrombie case are evident.
The evil of the agreement centered on the separation of the
voting rights of the stock from the other attributes of ownership.
Yet this occurs anytime an agreement uses an irrevocable proxy
for enforcement. In light of Section 12-16.14(f) (5), the South
Carolina courts should not make such an extensive prohibition
of agreements failing to meet the statutory requirements for a
valid voting trust. Yet the case is from an important jurisdic-
tion and thus emphasizes the importance of adhering strictly to
the form of either the Section 12-16.15 agreement or the voting
trust, without vacillating between the two.
A further consideration is how to give effective notice and
thus bind transferees of shares. In Johnson v. Spartanburg
County Fair Ass'n, after discussing the invalidity of any agree-
ment, the court stated: "The sale by Mr. Taxler of the twenty-
eight shares to Mr. Johnson ipso facto revoked the proxy which
he had previously given to vote stock.143 This would follow be-
cause the court had held the proxies to be revocable. It is argu-
able that the court meant more: that any proxy is revoked on
sale, whether revocable or irrevocable. The effect of the Section
12-16.15 agreements, using the Section 12-16.14 (f) (5) irrevocable
proxy, is clarified by Section 12-16.14(h). 4 Actual knowledge
will bind the transferee. In addition, notice of the irrecovable
proxy on the share certificate will suffice.45 There is no com-
parable provision for binding transferees when a Section 12-16.15
agreement does not provide for an irrevocable proxy. Thus, the
use of the irrevocable proxy is important in clarifying trans-
feree's rights as well as providing for effective enforcement.
In drafting the voting features of a Section 12-16.15 agree-
ment, any provision expressly providing for disproportionate
requirements of filing a copy of the agreement at the principal office. The court
again indicated no third parties were involved. It re Farm Industries, Inc., 196
A.2d 582 (Del.Ch. 1963). The court's result can be wholeheartedly endorsed, but
considering the evident attitude expressed in the Abercrombie case, it is doubt-
ful this tenuous distinction will be upheld on appeal.
43. Johnson v. Spartanburg County Fair Ass'n, 210 S.C. 56, 73, 41 S.E.2d
599 (1947).
44. "A proxy may be revoked, notwithstanding a provision making it irrevo-
cable, by a purchaser of shares without knowledge of the existence of such pro-
vision, unless notice of the proxy and of its irrevocability plainly appears on the
face or back of the certificate representing such shares." S. C. CoDE ANN.
§ 12-16.14(h) (1962).
45. The requirement of notice on the share certificate closely coincides with
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act requirement that any stock restriction must
appear on the share certificate to be binding on transferees. See S. C. CODE
ANxN. § 12-17.18 (1962).
9
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voting power or varying voting strength should be avoided.
An agreement to give a holder of twenty-five per cent of the
shares fifty per cent of the voting power was invalidated because
it conflicted with statutory norms providing for voter power. 0
The South Carolina Constitution and Code could be similarly
construed. 47 In any event, such a provision should at least be
included in the articles of incorporation. 8
S/hareholders' Management Agreements
The shareholder management agreement is used to turn over
certain management functions, normally within the province
of the directors, to the shareholders. It may be restricted to only
several situations, or it may more broadly include many areas.
Although similarity exists between the shareholder management
agreement and the shareholder voting agreement, analytically
they must be considered separately since they must meet differ-
ent mandatory statutory standards. On the other hand, a share-
holder voting agreement could be used to provide the decision-
making apparatus of a shareholder management agreement.
The shareholder management agreement has obvious value
since areas of potential trouble can be considered and resolved
by pre-arrangement. It is perfectly reasonable that potential dis-
cord should be handled in advance. In the close corporation, cor-
porate business policy is usually the intimate concern of the
shareholders. Often such matters can be best handled by the
shareholders under an arrangement similar to the partnership.
Section 12-16.2249 represents a significant and important de-
46. Nickolopoulos v. Sarantis, 102 N. J. Eq. 585, 141 At. 792 (1928). How-
ever, an agreement whereby one shareholder agrees not to vote his stock has
been upheld. Trefether v. Amazeen, 93 N.H. 110, 36 A.2d 266 (1944).
47. Compare S. C. CONST. art. 9 § 11 (1895) ("... each shareholder shall be
allowed to cast . .. as many votes as the number of shares he owns . . .")
with S. C. CODE § 12-15.1 (1962) (The articles of incorporation may grant,
limit or deny the voting rights of the shares . . ").
48. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-15.1 (1962). would be satisfied although constitu-
tional, objections may still be raised.
49. "(a) No agreement among shareholders respecting the management and
affairs of their corporation or the relations of shareholders among them-
selves shall be deemed invalid solely because the agreement purports to
treat the affairs of the corporation as if it were a partnership and the
shareholders as if they were partners.
(b) No written agreement, whether contained in the articles of incor-
poration or bylaws or in a written side agreement, and which relates to
any phase of the affairs of the corporation, shall be deemed invalid solely
because the agreement limits or restricts the powers or discretion of the
directors of the corporation, if the following conditions are satisfied:
[Vol. 16
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parture from the general law.50 The tone is set by Section 12-
16.22(a) which rejects the contention that corporate character-
istics cannot be mingled with those of the partnership. This
creates a friendly atmosphere for incorporated partnership ar-
rangements which, in turn, should encourage judicial tolerance.5 1
Section 12-16.22(a) may have significance apart from its expres-
sion of an attitude. While courts can still pronounce manage-
ment agreements invalid,52 if the agreement otherwise complies
with the requirements of Section 12-16.22, it is arguable that all
functions of management could validly be surrendered to the
shareholders.
The principal argument against restricting the management
powers of directors is that in most states full management pow-
ers are entrusted to them by statute. s Sterilization of the board
(1) The agreement is set forth, or its existence is clearly referred
to, in the articles of incorporation;
(2) The agreement has been authorized by all shareholders of the
corporation, whether or not entitled to vote to elect directors;
(3) The term of the agreement does not exceed ten years from the
date thereof. Any such agreement shall be renewable at any time with-
in one year before the expiration of such ten-year period by agree-
ment of all of the shareholders bound thereby at the date of renewal.
(c) An agreement authorized by subsection (b) shall be valid only so
long as the shares of the corporation are not traded on any national se-
curities exchange or regularly traded in any over-the-counter market
maintained by one or more brokers or dealers in securities.
(c-1) The text of any agreement authorized by subsection (b) shall be
set forth in full, or a clear reference shall be made to the agreement,
upon the face or back of each certificate for shares issued by the cor-
poration.
(d) A transferee of shares in a corporation whose shareholders have
entered into an agreement authorized by subsection (b) shall be bound
by such agreement if he takes the shares with actual notice thereof. A
transferee shall be deemed to have actual notice of any such agreement
if the text of the agreement, with any amendments, is set forth in the
articles of incorporation.
(e) The effect of an agreement authorized by subsection (b) shall be
to relieve the director or directors of, and to impose upon the shareholders
consenting to the agreement, the liability for managerial acts or omission
that is imposed by law upon directors to the extent that and so long as
the discretion or powers of the directors in their management of cor-
porate affairs is controlled by any such provision." S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-16.22 (1962).
50. Section 12-16.22 has expanded coverage compared with other statutes.
Compare N. Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 620; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1960).
The new Corporation Code recently adopted in Florida is very similar to Sec-
tion 12-16.22. See FLA. LAws 1963, Ch. 63-379, § 6.
51. See Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Bisiness
Corporation Act, 34 N. C. L. REv. 432, 438 (1955-56).
52. Id. at 439. This might result where the agreement did not satisfy the man-
datory requirements of Section 12-16.22. Such an agreement would likely count-
er other traditional attacks.
53. 1 O'NF-AL, CLOSE CORPORATioNs: LAW AND PRAcTicE 235-40 (2 vols.
1958).
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of directors is contrary to the corporate norm of management.
Thus many courts view a contract as "illegal and void so far
as it precludes the board of directors, at the risk of incurring
legal liability, from changing officers, salaries or policies or
retaining individuals in office, except by consent of the contract-
ing parties."54 The new Code discards the corporate norm theory
by providing:
Subject to any provisions permitted by chapters 1.1 to 1.14
of this Title to be contained in the articles of incorporation,
the bylaws, or agreements among shareholders, the business
and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors.5 5 (Emphasis added.)
This precludes any suggestion that management is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the directors. It is interesting to note
that this section is not limited to the close corporation. However,
little harm is likely since the publicly held corporation will prob-
ably be unable practically to effect the shareholder management
arrangement.
Section 12-16.22(b) sets forth specific requirements for share-
holder agreements that limit or restrict the powers of directors.
This provision does not provide for validity, rather, it prohibits
the argument that the restriction of the directors' management
power is a factor in determining invalidity. The first require-
ment is that the agreement be set forth or referred to in the
articles of incorporation. The policy underlying this condition
is not clear. While this might provide notice to those dealing
with the corporation in some cases, it is doubtful that third
parties will examine the articles of incorporation or should be
bound by an agreement which limits the powers of the board of
directors. The transferees of shares are protected by notice on
the share certificate 55a The requirement hardly seems justified,
particularly since such a provision is most likely to be taken
advantage of by a contracting party who wishes to welch on
bargained-for obligations.
The most important requirement is that the agreement have
unanimous shareholder consent. Any shareholder arrangement is
54. McQuade v. Stoneham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
Accord, Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theater Co., 297 N.Y.
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948) ; Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
Also see Comment, "Shareholders Agreements" and the Statutory Norm, 43
CORNELL L. Q. 68 (1957).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.1 (1962).
55a. See infra notes 60-63, and text discussion.
[Vol. 16
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greatly strengthened when it has been unanimously proved. 50
The argument that minority shareholders may be oppressed by
shareholder agreements is most persuasive where the actions of
directors are being restricted and supplanted by shareholder
management. Absent statute there is some tendency to disregard
inconsequential holdings in determining the validity of share-
holder agreementsS7 The new Code has taken a firm position
opposing any such laxation where shareholder management
agreements are involved. The burden of this requirement should
not be too overwhelming in most close corporations. In the initial
stages of the business, unanimous agreement can usually be
reached on management and other policy problems. Thus Section
12-16.22(b) (2) provides needed clarity of the rights of minority
shareholders.
Section 12-16.22(b) (3) requires that the agreement not extend
beyond ten years, with a renewable provision for an additional
ten year period. Unfortunately, this provision contains the am-
biguity of the Section 12-16.15 agreement in respect to agree-
ments which by their terms extend beyond the ten-year limita-
tion. A strong case can be made for invalidity since the provision
is one of three clearly mandatory requirements. There is no good
policy reason why an over-extended term in a shareholder man-
agement agreement should not be treated similarly to the voting
trust, i.e., to permit the agreement to be valid for a ten-year
period.58
Section 12-16.22(b) agreements are restricted to the close cor-
poration, defined by Section 12-16.22(c) as any corporation the
shares of which are not regularly traded. 9 Absent such a re-
quirement, it would be difficult to envision a Section 12-16.22(b)
agreement in a publicly held corporation. As a practical matter
unanimity could hardly be achieved. If the shareholders unani-
mously agree and sufficient steps are taken to notify potential
transferees, perhaps a corporation actively traded should be
entitled to achieve a shareholder management policy.
56. See 1 O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 283-88.
57. Id. at 286. Note that unanimous consent is not needed for a valid Section
12-16.15 agreement. For a good discussion of the danger of less than unanimous
shareholder agreements see LATTIN, CORPGRATIONS 332 (1959).
58. Compare S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.16(f) (1962).
59. This definition corresponds with Professor O'Neal's view. See 1 O'NEAL,
op. cit. supra note 53, at 5. The New York and North Carolina statutes do not
restrict the availability of their sections to the close corporation. See N. Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 620; N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (1960). Florida accords with
the South Carolina limitation. FLA. LAws, Ch. 63-379 § 6 (1963).
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Sections 12-16.22(c-1) and 12-16.22(d) attempt to clarify the
effect of a Section 12-15.22(b) agreement on transferees of
shares. Section 12-16.22(c-1) states that the agreement shall be
set forth or clearly referred to on each share certificate. At first
glance this requirement seems to establish constructive notice
to transferees similar to other shareholder arrangements,6 0 but
unfortunately the effect of making or omitting the required
reference is not clear. The provision may be interpreted as a
mandatory condition to the agreement's validity but not con-
stituting notice to transferees. Section 12-16.22(d) deals more
directly with transferees. The agreement is binding on the trans-
feree of shares if he has actual notice of the agreement or if the
agreement is fully set forth in the, articles of incorporation. Since
Section 12-16.22(b) (1) requires that the agreement be set forth
or clearly referred to in the articles, there is no good reason why
he should not be considered equally bound by a reference to the
agreement. Knowledge of the reference would put the transferee
on notice to investigate further. If the intention were to bind
the transferee to information contained in the articles, it is
redundant to have the agreement binding when in the articles,
since its inclusion in the articles is a mandatory requirement of
validity. A better overall approach is to key the notice to trans-
ferees solely to the share certificates. It is unlikely that the pur-
chaser of shares will examine the articles of incorporation, 61
and, further, the use of the articles of incorporation as the means
for providing notice to transferees is inconsistent with other
notice provisions. 2 The draftsman should specify in the agree-
ment to what extent it is binding on transferees and the status
of the agreement if it is found not to be binding.
63
Directors have the duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care
in their management of the corporation.(4 The potential lia-
bility for negligence has been influential in invalidating restric-
tions on directors' management on the grounds that liability
60. Compare S. C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-16.14(h) and 12-17.18 (1962). No re-
quirement is necessary for the voting trust since transferees would receive trust
certificates. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.16 (1962).
61. See Moore, Shareholders, 15 S. C. L. R. 381, 393 (1963).
62. See supra note 60.
63. If the agreement is not binding on a transferee it may be automatically
invalid since it fails to meet the unanimity requirement of Section 12-16.22 (b)
(2) (1962).
64. In South Carolina the degree of care is set by Section 12-18.15. See S. C.
CODE ANN. § 12-18.15 (1962) (". . . diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions.").
[Vol. 16
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should be commensurate with responsibility. 5 This policy con-
sideration is effectively eliminated by Section 12-16.22(e). To
the extent that the agreement takes managerial powers away
from the directors and gives them to the shareholders, the lia-
bility for negligent acts or omissions in respect to such powers
and the corresponding duty of care is also transferred to the
shareholders. This provision adds needed clarification of the
effect of the management agreement on directors' responsibili-
ties. Absent such statutory provision, the law is not clear whether
the forced delegation of functions by the shareholder would
relieve the directors of ultimate responsibility.
Unlike the voting agreement's irrevocable proxy provision, the
shareholder management agreement has no built-in enforcement.
A court action would likely be required to force reluctant parties
to act in accordance with the agreement. Since the corporation
will probably be a party to the proceedings and will have a role
in the court's decision, enforcement difficulty may be minimized
if the corporation is made one of the contracting parties.6 6 The
agreement could provide that the parties would vote their stock
and take whatever other action is necessary to cause the corpora-
tion to become a formal party to it.
Professor O'Neal has mentioned several other drafting pre-
cautions which apply equally to shareholder voting and manage-
ment agreements.6" First, care should be taken to specify the
situations or functions to which the agreement applies in a defi-
nite, unambiguous manner. The agreement should also be clear
on the rights and duties of the various parties. The possible
contingencies that may raise interpretation problems should be
anticipated and provided for. For example, what is the effect of
death or long continued illness of one of the parties to the agree-
ment, or what would a transfer by means of gift or inheritance
have on the transferee's rights. The agreement should bind the
parties only in their capacity as shareholders, and not as di-
65. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507 (1890); Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24,
64 N.E.2d 439 (1946) ; Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 At. 568 (1910);
McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934).
66. See O'Neal, Protecting Shareholders' Control Agreements Against At-
tack, 14 Bus. LAW 184, 202-03 (1958-59). An agreement between all sharehold-
ers affords a private remedy but does not bind the corporation. Batos v. United
Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951). A corporation will not be en-
joined from violating a shareholder agreement to which it is not a party.
Thresher v. Cuddy-Gardner Co., 165 Atl. 438 (R.I. 1933). These cases repre-
sent the minority view. See O'Neal, supra at 203.
67. For a more detailed discussion of protecting shareholder agreements from
attack, see O'Neal, supra note 66.
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rectors since directors are not permitted to enter into contracts
respecting the casting of their votes or undue delegation of their
duties.08 Lastly, a severability clause should be included in the
agreement if part of the agreement may be declared invalid and
the parties want the remainder to be enforced.
Voting Tmusts
A device to secure voting control which has many similarities
to the shareholder voting agreement is the voting trust. In this
arrangement the shareholders transfer legal title for a definite
period to a voting trustee and in return receive trust certificates.
This exchange of shares for trust certificates is the major legal
distinction between the voting trust and the shareholder voting
agreement.
Although voting trusts were subjected to judicial suspicion at
the turn of the century, today they are recognized as valid in
every jurisdiction either by statute or judicial decision, provided
they are for a permissible purpose. Professor Ballentine lists
the following purposes as legitimate:
(1) To aid in reorganization plans and adjustments
with creditors in bankruptcy or financial difficulty; (2) to
assist financing, to procure loans, and to protect bondhold-
ers and preferred shareholders; (3) to accomplish some
definite plan or policy for the benefit of the company and
to assure stability and continuity of management for this
purpose; (4) to prevent rival concerns or competitors from
gaining control; (5) to apportion representation and pro-
tect minority interests or those with balanced holdings, as
in corporations to exploit a patent, by putting the selection
of directors in impartial hands; (6) in connection with
mergers, consolidations or purchase of a business, in order
that the predecessors or constituents, though in the minority,
may have representation.69
The voting trust is most commonly used to insure a responsible
management in a reorganized corporation." In this situation the
voting trust satisfies the need both for a guaranteed control
68. See Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946); Miller v.
Vanderlip, 285 N.Y. 116, 33 N.E.2d 51 (1941).
69. Ballantine, Vohting Trusts, Their Abuses and Regulation, 21 TEXAS L.
Rsv. 139, 152-53 (1942).
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arrangement and for a solemn, formal arrangement reflecting
the transfer of control to a new group.
In Alderman v. Alderman"7  the South Carolina Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the validity of the voting trust. The
trust was formed for the general purpose of securing a stable and
continuous management. The significance of the common law
trust recognized in the Alderman case is considerably lessened
by the new corporation law. Section 12-16.1672 creates a statutory
71. 178 S.C. 9, 101 S.E. 897 (1935).
72. "(a) Any shareholder or shareholders may create a voting trust, revo-
cable or irrevocable, for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trus-
tees the right to vote or otherwise represent their shares, for a period not
exceeding ten years, by executing a written agreement specifying the
terms and conditions of the voting trust, and by transferring the shares
to such trustee or trustees for the purposes stated in the agreement. The
certificates or shares so transferred may be
(1) surrendered by the trustee to the corporation which shall thereupon
cancel the shares and issue new certificates therefor to the trustee or
trustees stating that they are issued under the voting trust agreement or
(2) in lieu thereof, retained by the trustee.
In either case, the corporation shall specifically enter into its records the
fact that such shares are subject to the voting trust agreement. In any
case, trust certificates shall be issued by the trustees to the shareholders
who transfer their shares in trust.
(b) A fully conformed copy of the voting trust agreement (including
any amendments to or changes in the agreement) shall be on file both at
the corporation's registered office, and with the voting trustee or trustees.
Such conformed copies shall be subject at any reasonable time to exam-
ination by any shareholder of the corporation, or by any holder of a vot-
ing trust certificate, in person or by attorney or other agent.
(c) The trustee or trustees shall keep a complete and current list of
the names and addresses of all persons who are holders of voting trust
certificates and the number and class of shares represented by the certifi-
cates held by them and the date when they became the owners thereof.
Such list shall be kept on file at the office of the trustee or trustees and
at the registered office of the corporation, and shall be subject at any
reasonable time to examination by any shareholder of the corporation or
by any holder of a voting trust certificate, in person or by attorney or
other agent.
(d) The holder of a voting trust certificate shall be considered to be
a shareholder of the shares represented by his trust certificate with re-
spect to his right to inspect corporate books and records.
(e) At any time within one year before the expiration of a voting trust
agreement as originally created or as extended under this subsection, one
or more holders of voting trust certificates may, by agreement in writing,
extend the duration of such agreement, nominating the same or substitute
trustee or trustees, for an additional period not to exceed ten years from
the date of such extension. Such extension agreement shall not affect the
rights or obligations of persons not parties to the agreement, and such
persons shall be entitled to remove their shares from the trust and prompt-
ly to have their share certificates reissued to them. The extension agree-
ment shall comply with all provisions of this section applicable to the
original voting trust agreement.
(f) The validity of a voting trust agreement, otherwise lawful, shall
not be affected during a period of ten years from the date of its creation
or extension, by the fact that by its terms it will or may last beyond such
ten-year period; but it shall, after the expiration of such ten-year period,
be inoperative.
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voting trust in South Carolina. Undoubtedly the section has
occupied the field and all voting trusts must meet the statutory
conditions. As noted previously,7 3 drafting efforts must strictly
comply with the terms of the statute and the document will not
be considered a shareholder agreement if it fails as a voting
trust. Voting trusts have failed where stock certificates were not
turned over to the trustee,7" or a duplicate copy of the trust was
not filed at the corporation's registered office.75
The voting trust is usually created by shareholders of the cor-
poration. It has been suggested that generally more than one
settlor is required to establish a voting trust.76 Thus, a trust
established by a single settlor would not have to meet statutory
requirements. However, Section 12-16.16 (a) permits single share-
holders to form a trust. The recognition of a unilateral trust
as a statutory voting trust may contain serious problems where
stock is in trust and the trustee holds voting power. Failure to
observe the terms of Section 12-16.16 may result in invalidity.
The shareholders who are permitted to join the trust should
be clearly identified.77 Several states expressly require that all
shareholders shall have the right to become parties. 78 The new
Code is silent and the issue is unresolved in South Carolina. If
other shareholders are allowed to join they may gain control of
the trust. The trust could be open to all shareholders and control
protected by establishing a group as qualified trustees.
79
The legitimate duration of a voting trust has caused consid-
erable difficulty. At common law the criteria was reasonableness
measured by the purpose. In the Alderm n case, the court up-
(g) The trustee or trustees under a voting trust agreement shall, un-
less otherwise provided by the agreement, vote upon all amendments of
the charter, and upon any merger, consolidation, dissolution, sale of assets
or voting trust agreement provides otherwise, whenever any provision of
chapters 1.1 to 1.14 of this Title grants a shareholder the right to dissent
to proposed corporate action and to be paid the fair value of his shares if
such action is effected, the holder of a voting trust certificate shall, to the
extent of the shares represented thereby, have such right as if he had not
transferred his shares in trust." S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.16 (1962).
73. See supra notes 39-42, and text discussion.
74. Smith v. Biggs Boiler Works, 32 Del.Ch. 147, 82 N.E.2d 372 (1951).
75. State v. Keystone Life Ins. Co., 93 So.2d 565 (La. 1957).
76. Note, The Voting Trust, 34 N.Y.U.L.REv. 290, 295 (1959). See In re
Will of Pittock, 102 Ore. 159, 199 Pac. 633 (1921).
77. BAKER AND CARY, op. cit. supra note 70, at 348.
78. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 32.
79. Compare DeMarco v. Paramount Ice Corp., 102 N.Y.S2d 692 (1950),
where such requirements were upheld although the statute required that all
shareholders be allowed to join.
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held a trust which was to last until the death of the survivor of
two trustees.8 0 Almost every statutory trust expressly provides
for a maximum legal duration. Section 12-16.16(a) limits the
trust to ten years. In addition, Section 12-16.16 (a) permits an
extension for an additional ten years for those shareholders who
agree to the extension within one year before the expiration of
the trust. Any person objecting to the extension is entitled to
remove his shares from the trust. Several cases have held that
voting trusts which exceed the maximum term set forth in the
statute are invalid.8 ' Section 12-16.16(f) rejects this view by
providing that validity is not affected and that the trust be-
comes inoperative after the permissible period.
The other conditions of validity are clearly stated: the trust
must be in writing and entered into the corporation's records;
the participating shareholders must transfer their share certifi-
cates to the trustees and receive trust certificates; a copy of the
agreement must be filed at the corporation's registered office;
and a list of the holder of the trust certificates must be on file
at the office of the trustees or at the registered office of the
corporation.
The new Code clarifies the rights of trust certificate holders
in relation to inspection of the corporate books and records.
Since the shareholders transfer legal ownership to the trustees,
analytically they stand to lose various beneficial rights. Tradi-
tionally the right to inspect corporate books and records is
extended to shareholders, and, absent statute, this right may
attach to legal ownership and pass to the trustee.82 In such juris-
dictions a minority shareholder may find he has lost an im-
portant means of protecting his interest. Section 12-16.16(d)
specifically places the holder of a trust certificate on par with
the shareholder in respect to inspection rights8 1 This provision
80. Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 101 S.E. 897 (1935). Other states
have upheld long term trusts where the purpose required was extended period.
See Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 Pac. 908 (1917) (twenty years) ; Car-
negie Trust Co. v. Security Life Ins. Co., 11 Va. 1, 68 S.E. 412 (1910).
81. Christopher v. Richardson, 394 Pa. 425, 147 A.2d 375 (1959); Perry v.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del.Ch. 33, 191 Atl. 823 (1937). Also see
Kittinger v. Churchill Evangelistic Ass'n, 151 Misc. 350, 271 N.Y. Supp. 510
(1934) ; af fd mere., 244 App.Div. 876, 281 N.Y. Supp. 680 (1935) (trust agree-
ment held valid for ten years but an extension for a term beyond that allowed
held invalid).
82. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 184(b) (rev. ed. 1946); State ex rel.
Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 41 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (1940) ; Brentmore Estates,
Inc. v. Hotel Barbizon, Inc., 263 App.Div. 389, 394, 33 N.Y.S.2d 331, 336
(1942).
83. The provision accords with the Model Act. Compare MODEL Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. § 32.
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could possibly be considered conditional to validity if a violation
is attempted.
The trust certificate holder's rights, when he dissents to cor-
porate action which would ordinarily entitle him to payment for
his shares pursuant to Section 12-16.27,4 are clarified by Sec-
tion 12-16.16(g). The parties are permitted to provide for a
satisfactory arrangement in the trust agreement. Absent an ar-
rangement, a compromise is reached by allowing the trustees to
vote upon all proposed fundamental changes, except for those
shares representing dissenting certificate holders. The dissenters
are allowed both to dissent and to receive payment for their
shares in the event the action is approved.
Several additional precautions in drafting the trust agree-
ment must be observed.8 5 The duties of the trustees should be
specifically set forth. Ambiguity may be interpreted in such a
way as to create a situation that is contrary to the intention of
the parties. Again the major step in good draftsmanship is to
anticipate and provide for the contingencies. An obvious pre-
caution is to provide for the orderly succession of trustees. Their
voting procedures, the permissibility of proxies, and quorum re-
quirements should also be specified.
Interest in the voting trust as a control arrangement may
wane under the new Code. A major advantage of the voting
trust in the past has been the legal uncertainty of the shareholder
voting agreement,8 6 but this advantage has been eliminated by
Section 12-16.15. The usual enforcement problems of the share-
holder agreement have been corrected by the recognition in Sec-
tion 12-16.14(f) (6) of the use of an irrevocable proxy. The vot-
ing trust is obviously more formal and clumsy than the voting
agreement. The statutory requirements for the voting trust must
be strictly observed. The transfer of title to trustees may involve
prohibitive tax transfer costs.87 Since the shareholder agreement
can be used to accomplish the same ends as the voting trust, and
in most instances with a greater degree of flexibility, most
draftsmen should prefer the simpler voting agreement.
84. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.27 (1962).
85. For a more complete discussion of drafting precautions, see O'NEAL,
op. cit. supra note 53, at 307-10.
86. Id. at 313.
87. See ANNOr., 118 A.L.R. 1292 (1939); Orpheum Bldg. v. Anglim, 127
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1942).
[Vol. 16
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Greater-Than-Normal Quorum and Voting Requirements
A favorite method of assuring protection to minority share-
holders is that of requiring a high percentage or unanimous at-
tendance to constitute a quorum or vote for corporation action.
In effect, minority shareholders can acquire veto power over
some or all corporate decisions. Maintenance of the status quo
can be of great importance to participants in a close corporation.
They usually expect to be directors and officers at some agreed
upon rate of pay. If the shareholder participates only as an
investor he may want a veto over increases in salaries or other
corporate acts which may tend to jeopardize his investment. A
provision requiring unanimity or a high vote for shareholder
and director action may be the most effective method to protect
a minority shareholder against oppression by those in control. 88
In the absence of a statute it has been generally held that
specific statutory requirements respecting the percentage of
votes required could not be changed either upward or down-
ward ". . . on the theory that the public policy was expressed
in the statute."8 9 The usual objections to such provisions were
explored in the leading case of Benintendi v. Kenton HoteZ,
Inc. 90 In the Benintendi case several by-laws, requiring unani-
mous vote for action to be taken by shareholders or directors,
were declared invalid. The court stated that voting requirements
must conform to the statutes.91
High quorum and veto requirements may be established at the
shareholder level or director level. Both levels must be consid-
ered.9 2 Veto power at the shareholder level could accomplish the
desired control over matters subject to shareholders' vote. How-
ever, absent a Section 12-16.22(b) agreement, protection at the
shareholder level does not protect against acts by directors such
as salary increases or removal of officers. Protection only at the
director level has similar difficulties. The minority shareholder
could be injured by an amendment to the articles or by being
removed from the board of directors.
88. O'NEAL AND DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS Asso-
CIATES: "SQUEEZE-OUT" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES 177 (1961).
89. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 136 at 763; see 1 HORNSTEIN, COR-
PORATIONS 210 (1959).
90. 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 824 (1945). In New York the Benintendi deci-
sion was subsequently overruled by statute. See N. Y. STOCK CURP. LAW § 9.
Compare Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 1 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
91. Id. at 118, 60 N.E.2d at 831.
92. See O'N-AL AND DERWIN, supra note 89; Powers, Crossfire on the Close
Corporation: Norms Versus Needs, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 433, 441 (1958).
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The new Code permits considerable flexibility in using high
vote or quorum requirements. At the shareholder level, Section
12-16.8 expressly permits a provision in the articles of incorpora-
tion requiring a greater-than-normal number to constitute a
quorum.0 3 Undoubtedly, the section would be interpreted to
permit unanimity. Attempts to vary voting and quorum require-
ments may appear in various instruments. The Benintendi case
involved by-law provisions. Section 12-16.8 clearly indicates
that any attempted change in such requirements at the share-
holder level will not be effective unless it is in the articles of
incorporation.
Section 12-16.10 provides that corporate action is authorized
when it receives a majority of the shares cast "except to the ex-
tent that the vote of a greater number . . . is required . . . by
the articles of incorporation as permitted by chapter 1.1 to 1.14
of this Title . . . .14 The section seems to limit the use of a veto
provision to those situations which specifically allow a higher
vote requirement. This suggestion is buttressed by the fact that
several sections requiring shareholder approval specifically per-
mit a high vote requirement. 95 This limitation is unfortunate,
particularly since high vote requirements would not cover many
situations that would arise under a shareholder management
agreement. Although it is recognized that the better practical
technique is to use a high vote requirement, 90 in South Carolina
primary emphasis must be placed upon the high quorum require-
ment when assuring protection at the shareholder level.
Less difficulty is encountered in drafting high quorum and
vote requirements at the director level. Section 12-18.10 provides
for majority quorum or vote ". . . unless a greater proportion
is required . . . by the articles of incorporation or by-laws."
97
Validating the use of the by-laws or articles of incorporation
provides an atmosphere of maximum validity.
Still such provisions should be inserted in both the by-laws
and articles of incorporation. If the requirements are in the
93. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.8 (1962).
94. S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.10 (1962).
95. See S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-21.3(b) (1962). It is possible that Section 12-
16.10 may be interpreted to permit high shareholder vote in all situations but
that it must be in the instrument indicated by other sections.
96. O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Dicisions: Use
of Special Charters and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 451,
464 (1953). The parties at least come together when a high vote requirement
is used. Under a high quorum provision, the complaining party will boycott the
meeting thus prohibiting the possibility of an agreement.
97. 5. C. CODE ANN § 12-18.10 (1962).
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articles it indicates the parties give high priority to such pro-
visions. Notice is given to all interested parties of the limitation.
The requirements should also be set forth or referred to on the
share certificate. This insures that transferees will have notice
and will be bound. It is advantageous to repeat the provisions in
the by-laws. "By-laws serve as a guide for directors and officers
in the conduct of corporate activities; consequently, veto pro-
visions placed there are constantly before the attention of the
directors and officers."9 8
Arrangements, in which each shareholder has what is in effect
the power of veto, have several serious drawbacks. The chance
of corporate deadlock is increased. Further, the veto power may
be used to blackmail the other parties into granting unfair ad-
vantages to the complaining shareholder. One method of over-
coming much of the risk in the use of high vote or quorum pro-
visions is to require more than one person to effect the veto.
Since each of five shareholders in a corporation can elect a
director on a five-man board of directors, ". . . perhaps ade-
quate protection can be given minority interests against arbi-
trary action by the majority by requiring the concurrence of four
directors for effective action."9 9 In return, the corporation would
be protected from the arbitrary actions of any one director.
Although the abuses of veto provisions may be overstated, 0 0 it
is generally agreed that the draftsman should refrain from giv-
ing a blanket veto power. The individual situation requires care-
ful study to determine which interests need veto protection. It
might be advisable to include all veto-protected provisions in
the articles of incorporation and require unanimity for any
amendment. Thus situations which will be subjected to majority
rule will be primarily in the by-laws, although several by-law
provisions could also be veto-protected. No draftsman should
neglect to protect against possible change in the high vote or
quorum requirement by a mere majority vote. Such requirements
are hardly effective if they can be circumvented by majority
rule. The articles of incorporation should specifically require
unanimity to change agreed upon veto provisions.
98. O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 211.
99. Id. at 212-13.
100. "It might be argued that veto power or some other form of control in
a minority of stockholders is subject to abuse, but the answer is that the voting
powers of the majority can also be abused in a close corporation, especially
if the owners have unanimously agreed to dispense with orthodox majority
control." Powers, Crossfire On the Close Corporation: Norms Versus Needs,
11 U. FLA. L. Rxv., 433, 451 (1958).
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Classification of Shares
Another method of protecting minority shareholders is through
tailoring the share structure. A common control device is to
divide the stock into two or more classes and allocate to the
classes different voting rights. The draftsman could establish
two classes of stock with identical rights, except that one class
would have voting rights and the other would not. This would
enable the shareholders to give or sell a substantial part of the
equity without endangering their control. Another approach is
to use several classes of stock with each class being entitled to
elect one or more directors. This technique could be used to
achieve equal representation where the proprietary interest is
disproportionate.
The use of stock with no voting or restricted voting rights is
widely accepted. However, in a few jurisdictions the state con-
stitution requires in effect that each shareholder shall have the
right to cumulative vote. 10 1 Several states have interpreted this
provision to mean that each shareholder must have at least one
vote per share.10 2 Section 12-15.1 provides that the ". . . articles
of incorporation may grant, limit or deny the voting rights of
the shares . . . ." However, Article 9, section 11 of the South
Carolina Constitution requires mandatory cumulative voting
with terminology that raises serious doubt about the validity of
any attempt to limit voting rights. 0 3 Several commentators,
101. Approximately thirteen states require by constitution the necessity of
cumulative vote. See MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 31 at 522.
102. See, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art. XI § 3; People ex rel. Watseka Telephone Co.
v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922); W.VA. CONST., art XI § 4;
State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W.Va. 451, 96 S.E.2d
171 (1956). Contra, Shapiro v. Tropicana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 237 (Mo.
1963). Under a subsequent West Virginia Constitutional Amendment, a cor-
poration can issue stock with limited voting power. See Diamond v. Parkes-
burg-Aetna Corp., 122 S.E.2d 436 (1961). The Illinois view is most extreme in
holding arrangements which tend to limit cumulative voting as unconstitutional.
There a statute providing for classification of directors was held invalid. Wolf-
son v. Avery, 6 Ill.2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955). Contra, Bohaman v. Corpora-
tion Comm'n of Arizona, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957) ; Janney v Phila-
delphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956). See Sell, Impact of Clas-
sified Directorates on the Constitutional Right of Cumulative Voting, 17 U. OF
Pirr. L. Rsv., 171 (1956).
103."The General Assembly shall provide by law for the election of directors,
trustees or managers of all corporations so that each stockholder shall be al-
lowed to cast, in person or by proxy, as many votes as the number of shares
he owns multiplied by the number of directors, trustees or managers to be
elected, the same to be cast for any one candidate or to be distributed among
two or more candidates."--S. C. CoNsT., art. 9 § 11 (1895).
[Vol. 16
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including Professor Folk, have felt that Article 9, section 11 may
prohibit non-voting stock in South Carolina.
0 4
Without speculating about the final outcome of non-voting
shares in South Carolina, the legal uncertainty of such a control
arrangement makes the shareholder agreements or other tech-
niques preferable. A shareholder voting agreement can be used
to accomplish the same results as classification of stock- The pro-
hibition against varying voting power attaches only to attempts
within the formal corporate rule structure-where the attempt
is made by statute, articles of incorporation, or by-laws.105 A
shareholder voting agreement or voting trust, independent of the
articles or by-laws, would probably not be subjected to the con-
stitutional objection. 6 One important disadvantage of such
an arrangement is the statutory time limitation.
Several classification arrangements may successfully avoid or
lessen the constitutional difficulties. The use of non-voting
shares has been the arrangement most frequently attacked. The
use of classes of stock with each class electing a stated number
of directors has not been overturned, although certainly such
an arrangement limits cumulative voting.
1'0 7
104. "Attorneys fear that the broad language of the constitutional provision
might have two adverse effects. (1) It may render suspect any procedure, how-
ever reasonable, for regulating the exercise of the mandatory cumulative voting
right, such as the requirement that one who proposes to cumulate his votes give
notice of his intention either before the shareholders' meeting or at the meeting
before voting begins. (2) Some think it renders suspect, in varying degrees,
any provision which arguably cuts down the cumulative voting right." Folk,
The South Carolina Corporation Law: Reconsiderations and Prospects, 15
S.C.L.REv. 467, 482 (1963); also see Freeman, Directors and Officers, 15
S.C.L.REv. 398, 400 (1963); Moore, Shareholders, 15 S.C.L.REv. 381-82 (1963);
Nexsen, Classes and Issues of Shares, 15 S.C.L.REv. 357, 358-59 (1963).
105. The best discussion of this distinction can be found in Sensabaugh v.
Polson Plywood Co., 135 Mont. 562, 342 P.2d 1064 (1959). There a by-law
requiring straight voting was held in conflict with a mandatory cumulative vot-
ing provision of the state constitution, but a majority of the court would have
enforced a shareholder contract requiring straight voting. Also see E. K. Buck
Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
106. But see supra note 46, and the text discussion.
107. While cumulative voting may be avoided, often the minority interest
receives increased protection. Consider the following example:
It is possible that situations may exist, however, in which cumulative voting
will not fulfill the needs of a particular group. For example, Rich, Wells
and Poor own, respectively, 50%, 30% and 20% interest in a business.
They desire to incorporate and they wish a three-man board of directors
so that each can have an active voice in the management of the business.
Each likewise desires to be assured of a directorship, but cumulative voting
will not answer Poor's needs since, in this example, the mathematics of
cumulative voting would require control of one more than twenty-five
percent of the voting shares.
Under these circumstances, it would be wiser for the three men to use
three classes of stock, "A", "B" and "C" with each entitled to elect one
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A safer arrangement, and one which is seemingly used in
Illinois, involves several classes of stock but retains intact cumu-
lative voting.'08 Each share would be given a vote, but one class
would have $1.00 par value stock and the other class would con-
sist of $100.00 par value stock. The recipient of the $1.00 par
value stock would have a favorable 100 to 1 ratio of voting power
over the recipient of the $100.00 par value stock. Any number of
variations of the above example could be worked out in order
to meet the particular needs of the client. Care must be taken
to specify the other features, such as dividend and liquidation
rights, of the separate classes.
ConcZusion To Part One
The impact of the new corporation law upon the close cor-
poration is one of its most important contributions. Lawyers
are given maximum latitude in drafting the business form to
meet varying client needs. Several minor adjustments are still
needed. Article 9, Section 11 of the South Carolina Constitution
remains the major obstacle to flexibility. Imaginative judicial
decisions could do much to dispel uncertainty. However, the
paucity of cases that come before the Supreme Court of South
Carolina involving corporation law does not suggest judicial
solutions. A clarifying amendment to the Constitution would be
the ideal resolution.
director. Since the shares would be equal in all other respects, Rich would
get 50 shares of Class "A" voting stock, Wells would receive 30 shares of
Class "B" voting stock and Poor would take 20 shares of Class "C" stock.
In this manner Poor could always elect a director even if he sold any
amount less than 50% of his stock. Steadman, Maintaining Control of Close
Corporations, 14 Bus. Law. 1077, 1079-80 (1959).
108. This method is discussed in O'NEAL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 104-05;
Hoban Voting Control Methods, 1958 U. oF Iu. L. R. 110, 112-13 (1958).
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